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In June 2019 the Fourth Meeting in Philosophy, Probability and Scientific Method was or-
ganized at the Instituto Interuniversitario López Piñero (University of Valencia, Spain). 
Previous editions were held in Valencia (2006 and 2008), and Santiago de Compostela 
(2012). Among the participants in those three workshops I should mention: José M. Ber-
nardo, Gustavo Cevolani, Vincenzo Crupi, Igor Douven, Donald Gillies, Carl Hoefer, 
Deborah Mayo, Ilkka Niiniluoto, Jan-Willem Romeijn, Aris Spanos, Jan Sprenger, and 
Gregory Wheeler,
The topic for the Fourth Meeting was “Statistical Evidence and Evidence of Mecha-
nisms”. The three papers included in this monographic section are based on talks delivered 
at the meeting.
Why did we choose this topic? The mechanistic approach is gaining importance in 
philosophy of science in recent years (Glennan and Illari, 2018). Regarding such a vener-
able topic in philosophy of science as explanation, the causal-mechanistic approach traces 
back to the eighties —Wesley Salmon was one of its most egregious advocates— and re-
emerged with strength at the turning of the century (Machamer, Darden and Craver, 
2000). Right now, it is surely the most discussed option in the literature.
However, although the mechanistic standpoint has been mainly discussed in relation to 
explanation, a related debate developed in parallel concerns the notion of evidence. Statisti-
cal evidence is a fundamental source of information for natural and social scientists, and also 
for policy makers, so that there is a vast array of statistical techniques for getting reliable in-
formation about the process, system,.., under scrutiny. Certainly, those procedures are con-
stantly refined and improved, as any other components of scientific methodology, but lim-
itations of statistical evidence are widely known. On account of this, some authors claim 
that there is a further sort of evidence, namely, evidence about those mechanisms involved in 
the process, whose relevance has been unfairly downplayed. Underestimation is reflected in 
standardized scientific practice and in criteria for decisions followed by policy-makers and is 
particularly notorious in medicine/health policies and social sciences/social policies.
A central question in this discussion is what is the role for evidence about mechanisms 
in detecting/inferring causal relations. It is worth noticing that this question connects the 
notions of explanation and evidence. Provided that causation is crucial for explanation, ad-
dressing that question straightforwardly links evidence (about mechanisms) to explanation. 
And this is precisely the issue around which the three papers included in this monographic 
section revolve.
In ‘Mechanisms, Good and Bad’ Harold Kincaid tries to assess whether mechanisms 
are necessary, or perhaps, more or less useful, as evidence (i.e.: for confirmation) in favour 
of causal claims. Furthermore, according to him, the literature on mechanisms is not clear 
enough about basic questions related to the alleged importance of mechanisms. Depart-
ing from a distinction between horizontal and vertical mechanisms, he argues that neither 
of both may be considered as essential for evidence about causal effect claims (C is causally 
related to E). Kincaid uses directed acyclic causal graphs (DAG) ‒a formal tool popularised 
by Judea Pearl among philosophers to understand causality‒ to illustrate problematic situ-
ations where assuming the existence of mechanisms may lead to biased causal inferences. 
Nonetheless, he also acknowledges that mechanisms may be very useful in some contexts. 
His final conclusion is that there are no general methodological rules to determine when 
mechanisms provide evidence for causal claims. Rather, a case by case analysis is required, 
encouraging a contextualist perspective on scientific methodology.
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It should be reminded here that the EBM (Evidence-Based Medicine) approach in med-
icine insists on making explicit the evidence which grounds causal claims (Howick, 2011). 
Usually, the sort of evidence favoured by EBM is that provided by clinical studies, espe-
cially by RCTs (randomized controlled trials). Jon Williamson’s paper (‘The feasibility and 
malleability of EBM+’) deals with the EBM+ programme, an attempt to qualify the EBM 
initial programme by including a proper role for evidence of mechanisms in addition to sta-
tistical evidence (Parkkinen et al., 2018). Among the criticisms against EBM+ are that, al-
legedly, it is both a hardly feasible a highly malleable strategy for establishing reliable causal 
claims. Williamson’s paper deals with both objections and concludes, firstly, that the cur-
rent practice of IARC (International Agency for Research on Cancer) supports the feasi-
bility of EBM+. Concerning malleability —high malleability would be unwelcome since 
it increases the risk of subjective influences—, Williamson discards formalization as an ap-
propriate strategy. Increasing the quantity and the variety of the evidence is a more prom-
ising way to diminish subjectivity. Considering evidence about mechanisms in addition to 
“association studies” goes in that direction. Furthermore, Williamson points out we have 
“evidence that makes up for the deficiencies of other evidence”, so that some sort of mutual 
reinforcement is obtained. EBM+ is, then, vindicated given that the reliability of causal 
claims is increased.
The contribution of Saul Pérez-González and Valeriano Iranzo (‘Assessing the role 
of evidence of mechanisms in causal extrapolation’) is focused on a controversial ques-
tion related to experimental practice, namely, external validity. Let’s take for granted 
that a causal link has been firmly established for the population studied by researchers. 
Of course, in public policies we are mainly interested, indeed, in that will happen with 
the target population, that is, the population outside the experimental setting. The ques-
tion, then, is which is the relevant evidence for increasing the reliability of such extrapo-
lations. Is there any advantage in introducing evidence about the underlying mechanisms 
in both populations? Pérez-González and Iranzo maintain, firstly, that some common ar-
guments against the reliability of causal claim extrapolations based on statistical evidence 
do not allow us to infer that there are intrinsic, unavoidable, limitations for them. Sec-
ondly, they argue that extrapolations based on evidence about mechanisms are plagued 
with different and not easier problems (i.e.: masking, mechanisms’ absence of regularity 
in varying conditions). It is not clear then that evidence of mechanisms is able to com-
pensate the weaknesses of statistical evidence, so the former does not seem indispensable. 
Still, evidence of mechanisms may be very useful for causal extrapolation. In order to as-
sess its relevance, Pérez-González and Iranzo distinguish between a positive (supporting) 
and a negative (undermining) role for evidence of mechanisms in causal extrapolation. 
They argue that evidence of mechanisms may be crucial for concluding that the casual 
extrapolation is not reliable —this is its negative role—, while the positive role is much 
harder to fulfil.
In addition to the contributors to this monographic section I would like to thank all 
the other speakers at the workshop (Angelo Fasce, David García, María Jiménez-Buedo, 
David Teira), I am also grateful to the Instituto Interuniversitario López Piñero for their 
funding and for lending us the venue (Palacio de Cerveró). Finally, I would like to thank 
the editorial team at THEORIA and, in particular, María José García Encinas and Javier 
González de Prado, for helping make this special issue an instructive and rewarding experi-
ence.
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